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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Fred Zacharias published an article entitled The Images of
Lawyers (Images), in which he identified nine separate popular
conceptions or images of lawyers, arguing that each one had some
degree of accuracy in the real world and, perhaps more significantly, that
if anyone “were to suggest to an audience of lawyers and experts in the
legal profession that one of the resulting paradigms is false, at least some
in the audience would protest.”1 Let me list the nine without, for the
moment, further comment:
(1) LAWYERS AS CROOKS
(2) LAWYERS AS LEGALLY HONEST BUT SELFINTERESTED INDIVIDUALS
(3) LAWYERS AS HONEST AND WELL-MEANING, BUT
NEEDING GUIDANCE
(4) LAWYERS AS HIGHLY RESPECTABLE, SELFREGULATING PROFESSIONALS
(5) LAWYERS AS CLIENT PROTECTORS
(6) LAWYERS AS INDEPENDENT, OBJECTIVE
MONITORS OF THE SYSTEM AND OF CLIENT
BEHAVIOR
(7) LAWYERS AS ORDINARY AGENTS
(8) LAWYERS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT
(9) LAWYERS AS BUSINESSPERSONS2
Fred’s purpose in compiling this list was to offer advice to those who
draft lawyers’ ethics codes. He said they would be misguided in their
efforts if they failed to see that each one of these images somehow had
to be taken into account in the drafting process, less the results prove
ineffective, unenforceable, or socially unacceptable.3 The article itself is
subtle and complex. It offers axioms and postulates for taking account
of these nine different images in the drafting process. The thrust of
Fred’s position is twofold: (1) to decry any attempt to use one of these
images as the model in code drafting and (2) to identify which image of
lawyering is being used in drafting a given particular provision. Although
sympathetic with the spirit of this attempt, I am deeply concerned that
identifying so many various, and contradictory, images as separate
models distorts what I believe is a true central paradigm, but one that is

1.
(2007).
2.
3.
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very different in kind from any of the nine images that Fred has
identified. Long ago I identified that paradigm as the central moral
tradition of lawyering (central tradition).4 In contrast to Zacharias, I
think it ill-conceived, and perhaps impossible, to attempt to take one of
these narrow, fragmented images and point to it as the justification for a
given code provision. Surely, the basic modern ethics code—the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)—was drafted
initially as disciplinary “law for lawyers” and is, in almost all particulars, a
quasi-criminal code.5 So every provision is at once an image of
LAWYERS AS CROOKS, whatever policy impulse or other “image”
may have driven its adoption. Needless to say, the image of LAWYERS
AS CROOKS is hardly one that any lawyer or citizen would want as the
dominant one in an ethics code. The problem is that enforceability has
been an overriding theme in code drafting at least since the revision
to the 1908 Canons, which produced the ABA’s Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969.6 Subsequently, it became necessary
to draft with the idea that those who do not abide by the rules might be
disciplined. Hence, the quasi-criminal nature of the ethics codes. The
deeper problem has been the transformation of codes of ethics into rules
of law. Whatever else it does, it wipes aspiration away.7 Minimal standards
of conduct are all that can be reasonably expected when enforceability is
the end game. However, what Fred Zacharias was battling mightily
against in his Images article was a larger and more fundamental issue.
He called it the tendency in modern professional responsibility
scholarship to fight fiercely over the single proper image of lawyering.
For Zacharias, no single image captures the complexity of lawyering, but
while admitting that the code drafters have never really adopted a
unitary model, “except by omitting direct statements to the contrary,”8
4. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 311 (1990). My argument is that the central moral tradition is a rich and complex
set of practices and beliefs, best described in the Joint Report, infra note 36.
5. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1984). The phrase “law for
lawyers” is found in L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility,
63 A.B.A. J. 639, 639 (1977). Zacharias disagrees with my suggestion that the Model
Rules are quasi-criminal in nature. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 75.
6. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1979); see Fred C. Zacharias, The
Quest for a Perfect Code, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787, 787 (1998).
7. In the Model Code, however faulty the outcome, there was a theoretical attempt
in the “Ethical Considerations” to provide a higher minimal standard. See MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, preliminary statement.
8. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 93.
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he nevertheless thought they were in error in not being more explicit
about how these images shaped specific provisions. Nevertheless, he did
seem to think that image number five on his list—LAWYERS AS
CLIENT PROTECTORS—was favored in some way.9 Interestingly,
when Zacharias came to talk directly about the scholarly fight over
images, he dropped the notion of a plethora of nine competing ones and
offered, instead, three “camps” to describe how the players were
aligned.10
The dominant camp embraced what has been called, unfortunately, the
This conception
“standard conception of the lawyer’s role.”11
emphasizes the lawyer as the aggressive and single-minded champion of
the client. Its standard bearer is Monroe Freedman.12 The second camp
is less easily described but is characterized by a tendency toward a
justice model. William Simon is the exemplar here.13 What is striking
about these two camps is the willingness of at least Freedman and Simon
to espouse actions that would clearly go beyond the traditional ways in
which lawyers felt themselves constrained in conducting themselves for
clients. For example, each, for very different reasons, would permit
lawyers to “lie”: Freedman to stay true to the client,14 Simon to see that
justice might be done.15 I choose the example of lying for reasons that
will become obvious later in this Article. I think it is a telling critical
point against those whose views are extreme.
Zacharias explicitly identified himself as a scholar who fell into a third
camp.16 The dominant idea in this camp was its rejection of the extreme
one-dimensional positions of the first two camps. Although he kindly
credits me with helping him to see that “lawyers’ moral dilemmas”
cannot “be resolved uniformly by resort to a simple formula,”17 he does

9. See, e.g., id. at 92. Image number five is the “standard conception of the
lawyer’s role” by another name. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
10. Fred C. Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the Central Moral Tradition
of Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 492 (2008).
11. David Luban is often credited with first using this phrase. DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xix–xxi (1988); see also Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4
(2005).
12. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
13. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’
ETHICS (1998).
14. Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges,
Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771 (2006).
15. William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433 (1999).
16. Zacharias, supra note 10, at 493.
17. Id. at 492.
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not go so far as to endorse my notion that there is a central tradition.18
What keeps us in the same camp is a healthy respect for the complexity
of lawyering, particularly as the moral challenges change depending on
the tasks in which the lawyer engages—advocate, negotiator, counselor,
draftsman, et cetera.19 Nevertheless, because Zacharias is so concerned
with the plight of those who draft lawyers’ codes, he takes competing
images, true or useful in one context or another, and suggests there is no
single paradigm. The best we can do, he seems to say, is to identify
where each image has the most relevance and use it as a way to draft an
appropriate provision. We part company here. The difference between
us lies in what he sometimes calls an image, sometimes a popular
conception, sometimes a paradigm.20 We agree that no simple image or
popular conception can possibly capture the complexity of lawyering.
We disagree about paradigms. He seems to think a paradigm must be
simplistically conceived. I believe paradigms can be complex.21
A second issue that divides us is the object of our individual scholarly
efforts. Accepting the status quo with its diverse quarreling over what
should be the single dominate image of lawyering, Fred at least wants to
get the drafting right. I want to get the paradigm right and keep it before
us whether drafting codes or practicing law. He accepts that we must
draft law for lawyers. Surely that is the current reality. I argue, however,
that we must fight against this trend. We need to return to a model code
of ethics, not law. Why should lawyers, or any other group, draft laws to
govern themselves? We can and should draft a code of ethics, for that is
central to the contract any truly professional group makes with the larger
society.22 In exchange for a monopoly and the guardianship of one
18. Although Zacharias is clearly sympathetic to my position, he seems unwilling
to endorse it at least by not agreeing with my notion that the lawyer’s primary obligation
is to the system of law itself, its processes, procedures, and institutions. Id. at 499.
19. Compare Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 169, 186–90 (1997), with Lawry, supra note 4, at 336.
20. See Zacharias, supra note 1.
21. In matters such as these, the dictionary is not much help. A common definition
would be: “an example serving as a model; pattern.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1406 (2d ed. unabr. 1987).
22. It is inevitable that the issue of professionalism be squarely raised in
discussions such as these. I am content with Pound’s widely cited definition: “[A] group
of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service.” ROSCOE
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953). Neil Hamilton has
recently and eloquently expounded on the social contract theme embedded within the
idea of professionalism. See Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF.
LAW., no. 4, 2008 at 4, 4–5.
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important aspect of community life, the professional group pledges a
higher standard of conduct⎯in traditional terms, a code of ethics, not
law. Perhaps it is too late to reverse the historical trajectory. But I
believe if we can show more and more examples of how the best lawyers
practiced law within the historic central tradition, we might begin to
reverse the trend.
Images of lawyers abound. The Zacharian nine is only one way to
frame them, and Fred himself indicated there were others, even some
that he himself identified.23 Some years ago, an intriguing empirical
study was conducted, which resulted in the conclusion that there were
really just three dominant images of lawyers: Trickster, Hero, and
Helper.24 The authors of the study briefly defined these terms as
follows:
The Hero is aggressive, self-confident, competitive, energetic, successful, and
looked up to. (He is also active and intelligent.)
The Trickster is tricky, evasive, manipulative, overbearing, greedy, and cold
(plus intimidating, unethical, egotistical, and condescending).
The Helper is helpful, likable, cooperative, broadminded, understanding, and
informal (as well as accommodating and fair).25

Although acknowledging that the three images or “types” were
abstractions, the authors emphasized that they were “durable and vivid
pictures in people’s minds that occur in the form of concrete real
types.”26 Interestingly, these types were impervious to experience:
“Comments about lawyers in the Bible, in fourteenth- and sixteenthcentury England, in Renaissance Europe, and in America from the
colonial period down to the present show a remarkably constant picture:
a mixture of honorable distinction and popular dislike.”27 Thus, the
Hero is about solving problems, the Trickster is about winning or
making money, and the Helper is about helping people.28 Real lawyers
are surely a mix of all three,29 but they often self-identify with one of
these three, and people generally label lawyers as one of these three.30
Although the study is rich and complex, I want to focus only on one
aspect of it, which demonstrates the difficulties all of us have with
lawyering images, none of which conform to reality, but that are deeply
embedded in our collective and personal psyches. The problem, of
23. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 74 & n.6 (citing his own earlier work).
24. Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the
Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 179.
25. Id. at 180 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 181.
27. Id. at 184.
28. Id. at 186.
29. Id. at 219.
30. Id. at 178.
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course, is the adversary system of justice.31 As so many scholars have
pointed out, “the central role model for American lawyers is their
participating in the clash of interests and doctrines in adversary contest
or trial.”32 But as any lawyer knows, “such focus on the dramatic court
encounter is largely Walter Mitty-like dreamwork rather [than] a
description of occupational reality.”33 Worse, although most of us really
do know better, the preoccupation with lawyers in a criminal trial is the
dominant image of the dominant image of lawyers at work. Surely it has
made much more difficult the effort to make rules or suggest models of
behavior for lawyers as they engage in other work.34 Zacharias struggles
mightily with this problem, but because he is trying to help us draft
better rules, he simply urges us to see how other images might better
guide us in the effort. Because I decry the effort of drafting law for
lawyers, I want to suggest a different strategy.
The key to my approach is twofold: (1) it initially centers on an
examination of my notion of a central tradition,35 as best expressed by
Lon Fuller and John Randall in the 1958 Report of the Joint Conference
(Joint Report),36 and (2) it examines concrete stories of lawyers, as they
exemplify that central tradition. I believe we need to move explicitly
toward aspirations, or we will be forever caught in the messy
compromises entailed by efforts to legislate rules. I think the debate
about the rules themselves must be shelved. When they are revisited
after we examine carefully and deeply the central tradition and good
stories about good people, perhaps the rules will more resemble true
ethics codes, and we will be back on the road to a realistic sense of what
lawyering can and should be.37

31. Id. at 220.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 220 n.121.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
36. Joint Conference on Prof’l Responsibility of the Am. Bar Ass’n & Ass’n of
Am. Law Sch., Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159 (1958) [hereinafter Joint Report].
37. I use the word realistic intentionally. I have been a lawyer and around lawyers
for well over forty years. In my experience there are many more lawyers who practice law
more or less within the central tradition than there are lawyers who do not.
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II. THE JOINT REPORT
A. Introduction
Like the authors of Trickster, Hero, Helper,38 and like everyone who
tries to make sense of lawyers’ ethics, the problem starts and ends and
gets hopelessly entangled in the definition and meaning of the adversary
system of justice.39
The authors of the Joint Report preface their statement by saying that
“the chief obstacle” to “bringing home to the law student, the lawyer and
the public an understanding of the nature of the lawyer’s professional
responsibilities” is “the adversary system.”40 The authors did not
attempt to define what is meant by the term but simply used it broadly as
a way of talking about all of the “special services” the legal “profession
renders to society.”41 The Joint Report thus implicitly understands that
the lawyer holds a special office in society, presumably as a result of the
professional social contract previously mentioned. It states at the outset:
“When the lawyer fully understands the nature of his office, he will then
discern what restraints are necessary to keep that office wholesome and
effective.”42 The Joint Report does not further elucidate the meaning of
what this social contract is, nor does it attempt to narrow the definition
of “the adversary system.” Rather, it simply talks of the various duties
and functions of lawyers, as if these fundamental matters were impliedly
understood. All that is needed is a concise description of and reasoned
justifications for the lawyer’s duties and functions. The effort is to
describe and to justify a fairly well-understood tradition, but one that had
been lived and accepted, rather than thought through and written about
in detail. That is why, when I first read the Joint Report and
pondered it, I perceived it to be uniquely descriptive of the best
traditions of lawyering I had been taught and had observed after some
years of practice. Of course, as the authors also said in their preface: “It
is not expected that all lawyers will agree with [every] detail of the
statement, particularly in matters of emphasis.”43 It was clearly assumed,
however, that all good lawyers would easily assent to the broad
principles and general mapping of their professional responsibilities. No
doubt there was and will always be some dissent with respect to the
Joint Report. And, as Fred Zacharias points out, there is clearly some

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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vigorous—but, I would add, some very modern—scholarly and
professional debate about these matters.44 Nevertheless, I cheerfully
offer the main points of the Joint Report and the stories I will tell as
confirmation that the central tradition is alive and well. Even if I am
wrong, I will still point to the Joint Report and to these stories as
valuable aspirations and things not to be submerged and ignored as we
continue to discuss what it means to be a good person and a good
lawyer. The modern debate should be “paused” to listen to its own
traditional stories. New directions in drafting then might be found. For
now, drafting issues must be left for another day. First, let me dig into
the substance of the Joint Report and then tell some stories.
The heart of the document lies in an overview, description, and
justification for the three major services the professional lawyer performs:
(1) advocate and counselor in the administration and development of the
law; (2) one who designs a framework for collaborative effort; and
(3) one serving the public directly.45
B. Advocate and Counselor
“The lawyer appearing as an advocate before a tribunal presents, as
persuasively as he can, the facts and the law of the case as seen from the
standpoint of his client’s interest.”46 This is standard fare. However, the
justification offered for this descriptive statement is not the standard
one.47 The justification for this most basic statement is that it allows the
arbiter to stay neutral in assessing the matter, forbidding a hasty
assessment of the kind we are all prone to make.48 Moreover, because of
the necessary proceedings prior to trial, an orderly shaping of issues

44.
45.
46.
47.

See Zacharias, supra note 10, at 492–94.
Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1160.
Id.
Metaphor rather than justification is what is usually offered. See MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 11 (1978) (suggesting the Adam Smith theory of adjudication is
a “grimly combative proposition”).
48. “What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a familiar pattern
will seem to emerge from the evidence . . . .” Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1160. This
is not necessarily a matter of prejudice. It is a psychological reality. The point is this:
“An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for [combating] this natural
human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully
known.” Id.
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occurs, which allows a truly public trial to take place.49 In perhaps the
most contested part of the Joint Report, the authors go on to say this:
The advocate plays his role well when zeal for his client’s cause promotes a
wise and informed decision of the case. He plays his role badly, and trespasses
against the obligations of professional responsibility, when his desire to win leads
him to muddy the headwaters of decision, when, instead of lending a needed
perspective to the controversy, he distorts and obscures its true nature.50

Despite the snickers of many litigators, is this not the public good we as
members of society—not as self-interested players—want from our
lawyers and our court system? Is that not the goal we ought all to be
striving to obtain?
Law compliance is the first goal of lawyers as counselors.51
Moreover, by reminding the client of long-run costs, “the lawyer often
deters his client from a course of conduct technically permissible under
existing law, though inconsistent with its underlying spirit and
purpose.”52 Contrasting the role of advocate with that of counselor, the
Joint Report suggests that the benefit of the doubt given to clients and
their causes by the partisan lawyer in open court is “inappropriate when
the lawyer acts as counselor.”53 Moreover, “[t]he reasons that justify
and even require partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant
any license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of
conduct that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality.”54 Here is where
professional detachment is most important. In the central tradition, it is
simply confusion of role and function that collapses the advocate into
the counselor. Although the norm has been abused in recent times, it is
still commonplace to assert that the lawyer can and ought to be trying to
bring clients into compliance with the law.55 Again, if skeptical eyebrows
are raised, it is not because these are not appropriate aspirations but
because of the suspicion that too many lawyers act otherwise. Also,
important as it is, yet how can one possibly pass an enforceable rule on

49. Id.
50. Id. at 1161. David Luban contests some of the psychology behind these views
of the adversary system, which he largely attributes to Lon Fuller. See David Luban,
Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801 (1998). He also contests
the reality of some of the assertions made in the Joint Report. Id. at 821–22. To respond
to any of his criticisms in this Article would push us too far afield. It is enough here to
underscore that he endorses much of the Joint Report as worthy of aspiration. Id. at 829.
51. See Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1161.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate
Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
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the lawyer’s counseling function? It must remain aspirational, even as it
must play a crucial role in every lawyer’s day-to-day work.
C. Lawyer as Designer of Collaborative Frameworks
One of the first assignments I had as a young lawyer was to draft a
lease agreement. After several drafts, the partner in charge approved,
and it was signed. When I was next in his office, he showed me the
signed lease and told me we would not know for ten years whether the
lease was well drafted. That was because, he said, if it is clear and fair,
there will be no trouble about it. “Clear and fair”—that does not sound
like partisanship to me. But it sounds like what the drafters of the Joint
Report had in mind when they reminded us that “the great bulk of
human relations are set, not by governmental decree, but by the
voluntary action of the affected parties.”56 Individuals form corporations
and partnerships, conclude leases and contracts, and enter into
innumerable transactions, large and small, “by which their rights and
duties toward one another are defined.”57 Lawyers do the formal work
here, “anticipating and forfending against possible disputes, and generally
providing a framework for the parties’ future dealings.”58
Again, extreme partisanship does not get these jobs done. As the Joint
Report expresses it: “[T]he good lawyer does not serve merely as a legal
conduit for his client’s desires, but as a wise counselor, experienced in
the art of devising arrangements that will put in workable order the
entangled affairs and interests of human beings.”59
D. Lawyer in Direct Public Service
In this section of the Joint Report, a number of specific areas are
explored. Each of them expounds on a particular way that the lawyer
makes a direct contribution to the public good. Here one is reminded of
the salient fact of professionalism: public service is the lawyer’s
professional goal—before self, before profit, and in setting the kind of
constraints on partisanship that are reasonable and necessary for the
system to function as it should.60 The items listed are seven in number.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162.
See Hamilton, supra note 22.
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I will be brief in describing the central object of, as well as the reasoned
justification offered for, each:
1. Private Practice
The point was made before. “[P]artisan advocacy is a form of public
service so long as it aids the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when
it hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and obfuscates . . . .”61
It is also useful when what is learned as a partisan can be utilized to
change the law for the better, even if that law had previously been used
to the advantage of a client.62
2. As Guardian of Due Process
“The lawyer’s highest loyalty is at the same time the most intangible.
It is a loyalty that runs, not to persons, but to procedures and institutions.”63
The lawyer is a true guardian of the law and its processes. The
statement goes on: “All institutions, however sound in purpose, present
temptations to interested exploitation, to abusive short cuts, to corroding
misinterpretations.”64 Process, therefore, has a larger meaning in the
document. It is a way of making clear that the end does not justify the
means.65 That is surely one of the reasons why even the Model Rules
assign the lawyer the right to determine the “means” of delivering legal
services to clients.66
3. Making Legal Services Available to All
Equality under the law is an empty phrase unless legal representation
is provided to those who cannot afford to pay.67 “[P]ro bono publico
service is one of the bar’s proudest boasts,” even if the need has always
exceeded the supply.68

61. Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1162; see also supra text accompanying note 50.
62. The example used is of Thomas Talfourd, who won a case on the basis of what
he considered an unjust law and got it changed later as a member of Parliament. Joint
Report, supra note 36, at 1162.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1216.
66. Under Model Rule 1.2, the lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision concerning
the objectives of representation but need only “consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010).
67. Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1216.
68. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 16.7.1 (1986).
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4. The Representation of Unpopular Causes
The Joint Report proclaims that representing those “whose causes are
in disfavor with the general public” is a particularly important service
the legal profession provides. 69 This is because “the process of
adjudication is surrounded by safeguards”70:
They are predicated on the assumption that to secure for any controversy a truly
informed and dispassionate decision is a difficult thing, requiring for its achievement
a special summoning and organization of human effort and the adoption of
measures to exclude the biases and prejudgments that have free play outside the
courtroom. All of this goes for naught if the man with an unpopular cause is
unable to find a competent lawyer courageous enough to represent him.71

John Adams’s finest public moment came not as a founding father of the
Republic but as a lawyer, representing the hated British soldiers who
killed colonists in the infamous Boston Massacre.72 This example is
particularly apposite here because it took place almost 250 years ago,
showing the tradition deeply embedded even then.
5. The Lawyer and Legal Reform
The lawyer has “the best chance to know when the law is working
badly.”73 The lawyer also is the one who has “the special competence to
put it in order.”74 Therefore, it is inherent “in the nature of his calling”
for the lawyer to take responsibility for law reform.75
6. The Lawyer as Citizen
Lawyers have duties not only to make law substantively better but also
to do so as public citizens, skilled in knowing if and how a particular
solution to a problem might work.76 The “procedures and institutional
arrangements” require the expertise of the lawyer for sound
69. Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1216.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. In his old age, his pride in what he had done, which at the time lost him half
his practice, was recorded in these words: “[My] part in the defense was ‘one of the most
gallant, generous, manly and disinterested actions of my whole life, and one of the best pieces
of service I ever rendered my county.’” DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 68 (2001).
73. Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1217.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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implementation.77 Anthony Kronman’s call for the lawyer-statesman
has particular relevance in this setting.78
7. The Lawyer as Public Prosecutor and Legislator
These two public positions carry special obligations. A prosecutor’s
duty to justice requires “partisan advocacy” to be “severely curtailed.”79
And the lawyer-legislator has a particularly difficult set of conflict of
interest concerns. The Joint Report adds the caveat that every lawyer
faces conflicts, often of time and energy, and it cautions that every client
and every matter deserves the lawyer’s best professional effort.80
E. Conclusion
Even though I have offered many quotations from the Joint Report,
there is no substitute for reading and studying the full document.
Although too brief itself, it nonetheless provides the willing student an
abundance of insights into the central tradition, which can be found
nowhere else. The point of the study and the point I am striving to make
is that these aspirational statements must find a significant place within
any discussion of lawyers’ professional responsibilities, whether in the
classroom, at the drafter’s or the scholar’s table, or in practice itself.
When the Model Rules were being debated and the move to a
Restatement of Law format was not yet inevitable, there were still those
who argued that the move to “minimal standards” alone would not
“describe the kind of lawyering toward which the profession aspired.”81
That argument failed. As it stands now, we are in great danger of
becoming quibblers. We need a bigger picture. Aside from a deep study
of the Joint Report, another way to enlarge our vision is by telling and
retelling our best stories. I conclude this Article by the retelling of three

77.
78.

Id.
See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 3 (1993). Kronman could have written the final paragraph of the Joint Report’s
section on “The Lawyer as Citizen”:
Out of his professional experience the lawyer can draw the insight needed to
improve public discussion of political and economic issues. Whether he considers
himself a conservative or a liberal, the lawyer should do what he can to rescue
that discussion from a world of unreality in which it is assumed that ends can
be selected without any consideration of means. Obviously if he is to be effective
in this respect, the lawyer cannot permit himself to become indifferent and
uninformed concerning public issues.
Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1218.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. WOLFRAM, supra note 68, at 62.
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such stories, trying from time to time to tie the stories directly back to
the central tradition, as that tradition is expounded in the Joint Report.
III. LINCOLN THE LAWYER
In his Notes on the Practice of Law, Abraham Lincoln advised his
audience of lawyers: “Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal
winner is often a real loser—in fees, and expenses, and waste of time.
As a peace-maker the lawyer has a superior opertunity of being a good
man.”82
There are many stories that confirm that Lincoln practiced what he
preached. My favorite is this one, told by an early biographer, Frederick
Trevor Hill.83 Lincoln was approached by a prospective client to sue
another man for defamation. After an investigation into the matter,
Lincoln told the man he had a good case but recommended that the
client not pursue the matter. It seems the would-be defendant was the
client’s brother-in-law. It was characteristic of Lincoln to “discourage[]
litigation,” sometimes by even turning down a case, good on the law and
the facts because of the distress the suit would cause, perhaps also
because he thought the proposed suit was “not morally right.”84 In the
present instance, however, he did not turn the case down but proceeded
upon the client’s insistence. Initially, the case was dismissed because
Lincoln had filed a defective pleading. Lincoln was not pleased but
withdrew the papers and refiled with an advocate’s determination.

82. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Notes on the Practice of Law, in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
1832–1858, at 245–46 (1989).
83. FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 243–44 (1906). I have taken
some dramatic license with the story as Hill recounts it but not in any way that is
inconsistent with Hill’s understanding of who Lincoln was and what he was about.
84. See id. at 239–40. Lincoln’s words as reported by Herndon, his last law partner,
say all that needs to be said:
“Yes . . . we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her six
fatherless children, and thereby get for you six hundred dollars to which you
seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to me, as
much to the woman and her children as it does to you. You must remember,
however, that some things legally right are not morally right. We shall not
take your case, but we will give you a little advice for which we will charge
you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man. We would advise
you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in some other way.”
Id.
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“‘Now I will beat you!,’” he said to his opponents.85 And beat them he
did, the jury verdict amounting to “a large sum.”86 Nevertheless
“Lincoln was not satisfied with the result.”87 Recalling Lincoln’s words,
Hill went on: “‘As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity
of being a good man,’ [Lincoln] had written as a theorist, and in practice
he was still able to see that money damages do not heal family feuds.”88
After the verdict, Lincoln turned on his counseling skills again and
persuaded the client not to collect the damages awarded. Instead, the
plaintiff settled the matter with the defendant paying only “costs and
lawyers’ fees.”89 Taking his responsibilities for peacemaking further,
Lincoln asked that the adversaries should together fix his fee. They
declined, but Lincoln accomplished his larger task: a reconciliation had
taken place. He suggested that he had “honestly earned” a fee of
“twenty-five dollars.”90
This is a remarkable story. First of all, it shows Lincoln as an
enlightened counselor, always looking for the long-term good of the
client both before and even after winning advocacy had taken place.
The Joint Report suggests the lawyer should remind the client of “longrun costs,” even when legally in the right.91 These costs obviously also
include the damage done to others involved in the process—in this case,
a sister and, no doubt, a whole family. Secondly, it shows Lincoln as a
committed, partisan advocate. Although he discouraged the litigation,
once engaged in it, he was determined to win the day. Thirdly, his
efforts as peacemaker went well beyond his own financial well-being.
He requested his fee be determined by the two estranged litigants, in
order that their reconciliation be complete. In matters of fees generally,
Lincoln was as good as his word. In his notes, he had admonished his
colleagues never to charge “[a]n exorbitant fee.”92 In practice, he
reportedly refused to accept a fee from a referring lawyer until the total
“fee had been reduced to what he deemed a reasonable amount.”93 One
of his law partners was “highly indignant” and said: “‘Lincoln, you are
impoverishing the bar by your picayune charges.’”94 Lest any reader
believe Lincoln was not interested in receiving a just fee, let him be
reminded that Lincoln once sued a client, the Illinois Central Railroad,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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for failure to pay a $5000 “bill for services rendered.”95 But let it also be
noted that at trial, no one appeared for the railroad, and Lincoln received
a default judgment. Nevertheless, he agreed the case should be reopened
and tried to verdict, which it was: $5000 for Mr. Lincoln. Even here,
Lincoln agreed to have the verdict reduced to $4800 because he had
received a $200 retainer in the matter.96
In his Pulitzer Prize winning biography of Lincoln, David Herbert
Donald summarized the key features of his subject’s professional
reputation, two of which bear emphasis here. The first was his reputation
for honesty. It was in “handling hundreds of cases in the circuit courts”
that Lincoln first became known as “‘Honest Old Abe’—the lawyer who
was never known to lie.”97 The second, as we have seen in the Illinois
Central Railroad case, he “was also noted for his fairness to his
opponents.”98 Unless the issue was absolutely crucial to the success of
his case, he rarely objected to evidence or challenged a judge’s rulings.99
The Joint Report is littered with references to the lawyer’s obligations to
fairness.100 On the issue of honesty and of lying, I will defer comment
until later in this Article.
IV. ATTICUS FINCH
In 1960 Harper Lee published her singular novel, To Kill a
Mockingbird, to astonishing critical and commercial success. It was
honored by four major book clubs and won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction
in 1961.101 In 2010, fifty years after its first publication, it still sells
“nearly a million copies every year.”102 When asked in 2006, “‘Which
book should every adult read before they die?,’” British librarians voted
the book their top choice.103 “The Bible was number two.”104 In 1962,
95. Id. at 252.
96. Id. at 253.
97. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 149 (1995).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 149–50.
100. The partisan advocate is admonished not “to muddy the headwaters of decision,”
while the counselor is urged never “to participate . . . in a line of conduct that is immoral,
unfair, or of doubtful legality.” Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1161.
101. Timothy Hoff, Influences on Harper Lee: An Introduction to the Symposium,
45 ALA. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (1994).
102. MARY MCDONAGH MURPHY, Part 1: Scout, Atticus, and Boo, in SCOUT, ATTICUS,
AND BOO 1, 7 (2010).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the film version of the book won the Academy Award as best screenplay,
and Gregory Peck, who played Atticus, was the Academy’s choice for
best actor.105 In 2003 the American Film Institute named Atticus Finch
as the “Greatest Movie Hero of the 20th Century.”106
The book and its lawyer-hero are not just wildly popular with book
readers and film enthusiasts. In 2008, the American Bar Association
asked a dozen prominent lawyers to name “The 25 Greatest Legal
Movies.”107 Number one on the list was To Kill a Mockingbird.108
Lawyer and novelist, Scott Turow sums up what many young people
said to themselves as they contemplated becoming a lawyer: “I promised
myself that when I grew up . . . I would try to do things just as good and
noble as what Atticus had done for Tom Robinson.”109
What were the things Atticus did for Tom Robinson? How do they—
and other things Atticus said and did throughout the book—relate to the
Joint Report and to the central tradition? Before attempting to answer
those questions, a brief synopsis of the novel is in order.
Before it is a lawyer’s story, To Kill a Mockingbird is a child’s story
about “[growing] up good.”110 Indeed, the author sets us up for
reflecting on both of these matters, by placing the following epigram by
Charles Lamb at the beginning of the novel: “Lawyers, I suppose, were
children once.”111 The narrative is told through the eyes of Jean Louise
Finch, “Scout,” Atticus’s daughter. The authorial voice is both that of a
fully mature woman reflecting upon an important time in her childhood
and that of Scout as she was during those times. In Harper Lee’s words,
To Kill a Mockingbird is “‘[a] love story pure and simple,’”112 the story
of a daughter’s love for her father and his for her and her brother,
Jeremy Atticus Finch, “Jem” to all.113
The story is set in and around the year 1935,114 in a fictional rural
town, Maycomb, Alabama, which is also the county seat. I say “in and
around” because the novel encompasses nearly three years, from Scout’s
sixth until nearly her ninth birthday. Her brother is four years older than
105. Hoff, supra note 101, at 390.
106. MURPHY, supra note 102, at 34.
107. Richard Brust, The 25 Greatest Legal Movies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2008, at 38, 38.
108. Id. at 39.
109. MARY MCDONAGH MURPHY, Scott Turow, in SCOUT, ATTICUS, AND BOO, supra
note 102, at 194, 196–97.
110. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Growing Up Good in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 531,
532 (1994).
111. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (unpaginated preface) (Harper Perennial
2002) (1960).
112. MURPHY, supra note 102, at 41.
113. See Hoff, supra note 101, at 392 & n.19 (quoting Harper Lee’s editor).
114. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION TOPICS 3 (1985).
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she. Atticus Finch is around fifty years old, a widowed father of two, a
country lawyer, and a member of the state legislature. Much of the
novel concerns the antics of Scout, Jem, and their odd little friend Dill,
who lives next door only during the summertime. We see with Scout
and Jem how it was to grow up in the deep, racist South of the 1930s,
but also how it was to grow up in a real community under the watchful
eyes of many, but under the special, loving, and virtuous tutelage of an
uncommonly good and sensitive single parent. One of the important
virtues Atticus teaches by word and by example is “integrity”: that one
must strive to live the same way in town and in the home.115 For
lawyers I think this means—because of the way the story is told—that
you ought to practice law as if one’s children knew what you were doing
and understood and approved of it all. Central to the lawyer’s story in
To Kill a Mockingbird is the appointment of Atticus by the local judge to
defend Tom Robinson, a Black man, who is accused of raping a poor
White woman, Mayella Ewell, who is perhaps nineteen years old. In the
real world of law at that time would have been the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama in 1932, holding “that
impoverished black defendants in capital rape trials were entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel.”116 That case is not mentioned in the
novel but might have played its part in Harper Lee’s decision to have the
judge ask Atticus to take the case. The townsfolk may or may not have
known about Powell, but they certainly did not grasp what it meant for a
lawyer to represent an unpopular client. As one townsperson said to
another: “Lemme tell you somethin’ now . . . you know the court
appointed him to defend this nigger.” And the reply obviously represented
the average citizen of Maycomb’s thoughts: “Yeah, but Atticus aims to
defend him. That’s what I don’t like about it.”117
In defending Tom Robinson, Atticus goes the extra mile in every way.
Before the trial begins, Atticus sits in front of the jail, and with the aid of
the children, particularly Scout, he causes a mob of country folks to go
back to their homes and not lynch the Black defendant. In court, he

115. LEE, supra note 111, at 51 (“Atticus Finch is the same in his house as he is on
the public streets.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Atticus says often what he says
near the end of the book: “I can’t live one way in town and another way in my home.”
Id. at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. SHAFFER, supra note 114, at 4–5 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72–
73 (1932)).
117. LEE, supra note 111, at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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demonstrates clearly that Tom Robinson could not have committed the
crime because a birth defect had rendered his left hand unusable, and a
left-handed person was responsible for Mayella’s external injuries. The
jury is out for two hours but cannot overcome the prejudice they feel
deep in their hearts. Tom Robinson is convicted and, shortly afterward,
is shot dead by prison guards as he tries to escape.
The climax of the book comes when Jem and Scout are attacked by
Bob Ewell, the shamed father. During the attack, Ewell is killed by Boo
Radley, a recluse, who has secretly taken a liking to the children. Boo, a
withdrawn and frightened man, is a key figure in the book. The children
begin by committing pranks, trying to get him to “come out” of the
house.118 At book’s end he is no longer an object of curiosity and
ridicule but an individual human being, entitled to respect, gratitude, and
friendship—and the right to be let alone. The sheriff decides not to tell
the community that Radley killed Ewell but to say that Bob Ewell “fell
on his knife.”119 At first, Atticus protests the fact that the sheriff
proposes to lie to the community because he believes his son killed
Ewell in self-defense. The father wants to help his son work through
this painful experience, as they both stand up for truth. In the end, Scout
draws the moral as to why the sheriff’s solution is best. “Well, it’d be
sort of like shootin’ a mockingbird,” she says, alluding to a lesson in
noblesse oblige that Atticus taught her.120 Now, after much experience
in the world, she has learned it. She learned that Boo Radley was like a
mockingbird, an innocent. She learned the use of metaphor, as accurately
applied in the living world. She was a good reader and a good person.
She grew up good.
These are the basic facts, but they are not the whole story by any
measurement. To tell the whole story, I would have to replicate Harper
Lee’s novel, word for word. You would have to feel empathy for the
myriad characters in the book and get a deep sense of the American
South during the depression years. You would have to see and feel the
love story, the story of the children growing up good;121 the story of a
lawyer/father/gentleman who tries to be the same person in town as he is
in his own home;122 and the story of a man who tries to walk around in

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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the skin of the countless others who cross his path—and to teach that
morally imaginative trick to his children.123
For purposes of this Article, much of the story cannot be examined.
What I do what to examine are some of the things that inspired Scott
Turow to want to emulate Atticus Finch in his defense of Tom
Robinson. First of all, Atticus accepted the assignment of the Robinson
case from the judge, knowing full well that it would be an ordeal the
likes of which he had hoped he would never have to face. A colloquy
with his brother Jack expresses this perfectly:
Atticus: “I’d hope to get through life without a case of this kind, but [Judge]
John Taylor pointed at me and said, ‘You’re It.’”
His brother: “Let this cup pass from you, eh?”
Atticus: “Right. But do you think I could face my children otherwise? You
know what’s going to happen as well as I do, Jack, and I hope and pray I can get
Jem and Scout through it without bitterness, and most of all, without catching
Maycomb’s usual disease. Why reasonable people go stark raving mad when
anything involving a Negro comes up, is something I don’t pretend to
understand . . . .”124

As a lawyer, Atticus was thrust into a role he did not want, mostly
because he knew it would put his children in moral danger. Would they
grow up good, without bitterness, and without becoming racists? It is
noteworthy that the allusion to Christ’s suffering in the Garden of
Gethsemane125 is made. Atticus is human. He does not want the pain or
the danger to those he loves. But, he must use this case as a teachable
moment for his children because, as a lawyer, he cannot do otherwise
than to accept this case. He acts within the central tradition because he
represents an indigent who cannot pay for legal help, and he represents
the most unpopular of clients126: a Black man in the racist South of the
1930s who is accused of raping a White woman. Recall that John
Adams lost half his practice in representing British soldiers over the
Boston Massacre. Yet for Adams, it was one of his finest moments.127
It was the same for Atticus. In a nutshell, these are things that everyone

123. Early in the novel, Atticus says: “You never really understand a person until
you consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin and walk
around in it.” LEE, supra note 111, at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 100–01.
125. See Luke 22:39.
126. See Joint Report, supra note 36, at 1216–17.
127. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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admires about Atticus Finch as a lawyer. Over and above those things,
Atticus puts his own physical well-being on the line by sitting outside
the jailhouse the night before Tom Robinson’s trial. Like Lincoln,
Atticus was not narrow in his understanding of his role as a lawyer,
although it went well beyond what anyone could reasonably expect even
a good man to do. Moreover, although the novel does not tell of
Atticus’s other efforts on behalf of the Black members of his
community, we know there were many. When Jem and Scout attend
services in the local Black church, the minister says to them: “We were
‘specially glad to have you all here . . . . This church has no better friend
than your daddy.”128 We are not given specifics, but we know that
Atticus was a true lawyer-statesman, one who was elected to the state
legislative year after year, even after he represented Tom Robinson.129
He was a community leader who strove to help the poor and the
despised. And he was a man described as receiving the highest tribute a
community can bestow: “We trust him to do right,” says Miss Maudie.
“It’s that simple.”130
Although Atticus has his critics,131 he is universally admired for the
things he did as a lawyer for Tom Robinson. He is also universally
admitted for his parenting skills.132 Only one aspect of the Atticus Finch
we have come to know and love in To Kill a Mockingbird has been the
source of real moral criticism, even from some of his most ardent
admirers.133 Recall the scene near the end of the book, where the sheriff,
Heck Tate, engages Atticus in a heated debate over Heck’s decision to
tell the community that Bob Ewell “fell on his knife,” although there is
clear evidence that Boo Radley killed him with a kitchen knife.134 Still
thinking that Jem killed Bob Ewell, Atticus offers a passionate argument:

128. LEE, supra note 111, at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 279.
130. Id. at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. See Monroe Freedman, Atticus Finch, Esq., R.I.P., LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24,
1992, at 20, 21 (arguing that Atticus was not a good role model because he accepted the
underlying racism of his time and place). Freedman’s blast engendered a huge response
in support of Atticus, “the hero.” See David Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1992, at B7. Freedman mostly stuck to his guns but acknowledged that no writing of his
had trigged such a “fulsome response,” condemning Freedman’s position and supporting
Atticus as a role model. See Monroe Freedman, Finch: The Lawyer Mythologized, LEGAL
TIMES, May 18, 1992, at 25, 25.
132. See, for example, the extraordinary set of testimonials on both scores collected
in the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of To Kill a Mockingbird.
MURPHY, SCOUT, ATTICUS, AND BOO, supra note 102, at 43–214.
133. See, e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 114, at 9–18; Tim Dare, Lawyers, Ethics, and
To Kill a Mockingbird, 25 PHIL. & LITERATURE 127, 127–28 (2001).
134. See LEE, supra note 111, at 314–17.
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“If this thing’s hushed up it’ll be a simple denial to Jem of the way I’ve tried to
raise him. . . . Before Jem looks at anyone else he looks at me, and I’ve tried to
live so I can look squarely back at him . . . .”
....
. . . “Jem and Scout know what happened. If they hear of me saying
downtown something different happened—Heck, I won’t have them any more.
I can’t live one way in town and another way in my home.”
....
“I won’t have it.”135

Heck’s rejoinder was equally passionate: “God damn it, I’m not thinking
of Jem!”136 Confused and shaken, Atticus grew silent and “made his
way to the [front porch] swing and sat down.”137 Then Heck says: “It
ain’t your decision, Mr. Finch, it’s all mine. It’s my decision and my
responsibility. For once, if you don’t see it my way, there’s not much
you can do about it. If you wanta try, I’ll call you a liar to your face.”138
The sheriff continues, finally convincing Atticus that Boo Radley did the
killing and appealing in the end to Atticus’s own deep belief that it
would be like killing a mockingbird to drag Boo into the spotlight,
where he would be subject to:
“All the ladies in Maycomb includin’ my wife . . . knocking on his door bringing
angel food cakes. To my way of thinkin’, Mr. Finch, taking the one man who’s
done you and this town a great service an’ draggin’ him with his shy ways into
the limelight—to me, that’s a sin.”139

Now the acquiescence of Atticus Finch in this public falsehood
disappoints Tom Shaffer, perhaps Atticus’s most ardent admirer.
Because Shaffer believes Atticus to be a man deeply committed to truth,
he called this acquiescence, a “moral mistake.”140 Nevertheless, Shaffer
claims that Atticus remains a champion of truth telling, even as he
participated in the lie Heck Tate told to the community. Shaffer’s
argument is subtle and complex. I am not certain I understand it
completely. In one sense Shaffer posits that the complicated and corrupt
world all mature people come to know requires judgments to be made
that cannot be reduced to matters of rules and principles. This makes

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 316.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
Id. at 317.
SHAFFER, supra note 114, at 15.
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him a proponent of virtue ethics, of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis.141
Practical reasoning and practical judgments are so complex, we cannot
simply apply general principles to concrete cases. Instead we need to
trust the wise and good and mature person whose judgment we respect,
even if we do not quite understand where it came from.142 Indeed,
Shaffer says:
One thing you could say about Atticus is that he had character.
....
. . . We say that a good person has character, but we do not mean to say only
that he believes in discernible moral principles and, under those principles,
makes good decisions. We mean also to say something about who he is and to
relate who he is to his good decisions. When discussion proceeds in this way,
principles need not even be explicit. We can say, “How would Atticus see the
situation?” or “What would Atticus do?” rather than, “What principles apply?”143

But I think it clear that Shaffer really is not quite the Aristotelian this
passage would seem to indicate. Shaffer wants to ground Atticus in his
own place, time, and community. Of the decision in question, Shaffer
claims Atticus often sees the community’s delusions, but he is also
implicated in them.144 Shaffer thinks Atticus makes a moral mistake in
going along with Heck’s decision to lie to the community. Atticus is
sometimes blinded by his own identification with the community. So,
he does not applaud the decision. Still, Shaffer refuses to accept the
proposition that the decision pitted one principle—truth telling—against
another—protecting the weak and vulnerable—with the latter having
more weight in this case than the former. Because Atticus’s commitment to
truth was “so pristine that he was willing to see pain come to his . . . son
rather than tell a lie” and because “he saw protection of the weak so
pristine that it seemed to demand from him the surrender of his honesty,”
Shaffer concludes that Atticus expressed “devotion to both of these
values.”145 Put that way, I agree, but I do not see how this successfully
resolves the moral dilemma Shaffer himself concludes resulted in
Atticus’s moral mistake—that he was complicit in a lie.
Although the philosophical debate on these matters is interesting and
important in its own right, what is crucial for us are the implications of
this issue for understanding Atticus Finch as a lawyer, working within
the central tradition. I see two issues, each of which is related to the

141. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 179–80 (Christopher Rowe
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
142. This analysis follows Tim Dare’s. See Dare, supra note 133, at 132.
143. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 7 (1987).
144. SHAFFER, supra note 114, at 34.
145. Id.
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other. The first is the question of role and responsibility. The second
relates to the difference between truth telling and lying.
Firstly, it is beyond dispute that the decision whether to tell the
community that Bob Ewell fell on his knife lay initially with the sheriff,
Heck Tate. It was not the responsibility of Atticus Finch. Lawyers have
different roles to play both within a representation—advocate,
counselor—as well as in society at large—prosecutor, legislator. Heck
tells Atticus in no uncertain terms that this decision is his to make. “‘It
ain’t your decision, Mr. Finch,’” he says. “‘[I]t’s all mine.”146 It is not
at all clear that it was Heck’s to make. In modern times, there would
probably be an inquest or perhaps, the district attorney would decide
whether or not to prosecute Boo Radley. But in that time and place, it
may well have been Heck’s decision. Recall at the trial that the
prosecutor was a man named Mr. Gilmore and that he was not from
Maycomb but from Abbottsville.147 In all probability Maycomb did not
have its own prosecutor but shared one with another community. So, it
may well have been Heck’s decision, as the story itself seems to
indicate. What might have happened next? Well, Heck would have
announced the death of Bob Ewell, reported on the attacks, and told the
community that the assailant, who was drunk, fell on his knife. Atticus
may have raised some kind of fuss, but how? to whom? in what way?
to what end? Remember, Heck tells Atticus that he would be willing to
call Atticus a liar to his face.148 Under the circumstances, would the
ensuing row be worth it to the community? So, my guess is that Atticus
would just remain silent, and the incident would pass away, justice
having been done, although not in an official way. As Heck says:
“[T]here’s not much you can do about it.”149 The decision was not in the
hands of Atticus Finch, and nothing he could have done would have
changed the legal outcome. From the perspective of the central
tradition, Atticus would have wisely accepted his role and not interfered.
Secondly, there is an enormous difference between lying and not
forcing the community to listen to the fullness of truth. Lawyers should
not engage in the former. They should engage in the latter, only in
circumstances when it is absolutely required or when good judgment and
moral courage demand it.
146.
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148.
149.

LEE, supra note 111, at 316.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 316.
Id.

223

Lawyers should not lie. This means that lawyers should never make a
false statement of law or fact.150 Silence is another matter. Confidentiality
requires silence often. Mature discretion requires silence as often.
Interestingly, Fred Zacharias addressed this issue and tried to guess what
a lawyer self-consciously working in the central tradition would do if
asked an inappropriate question by the court. His answer was that the
lawyer could not lie, even to help his client. The best he could do was to
remind the court that it was inappropriate to ask such a question.151 It is
clear to me that Atticus Finch would never say, “Bob Ewell fell on his
knife.” Rather, Atticus would probably say, “The sheriff says Bob Ewell
fell on his knife.” This kind of distinction may not satisfy every moralist,
but it is second nature to lawyers. Moreover, ordinary morality would
dictate the same in a plethora of cases. Is telling the truth always a
requirement of good morals? I think the answer is “no.” Why, then,
should blurting out the truth to no good end be a mandate even for—
maybe especially for—a lawyer-statesman?
Atticus Finch rightly is admired by Tom Shaffer and others because he
was bound and determined to have the truth told in the courtroom in
Tom Robinson’s case. This is so firstly because Tom Robinson was
innocent of the crime charged, and the prosecution witnesses were lying
about the underlying events. So, a good defense lawyer would surely
work passionately to see the truth come out in those circumstances. Of
course, there is another dimension to the case. Atticus was also determined
to try to help cure “Maycomb’s usual disease.”152 As Atticus so eloquently
put it in his summation to the jury:
“[T]here is one way in this country in which all men are created equal—there is
one human institution that makes a pauper the equal of a Rockefeller . . . . That
institution, gentlemen, is a court. . . . Our courts have their faults, as does any
human institution, but in this country our courts are the great levelers, and in our
courts all men are created equal.”153

After a little more of the same, Atticus looks his fellows in the eye and
reminds them that “‘[a] court is only as sound as its jury, and a jury is
only as sound as the men who make it up. . . . In the name of God, do
your duty.’”154 So the public problem of virulent racism needs to be
cleansed by the acid of bitter truth.
But not always. Atticus does not tell old, cranky, racist Mrs. Dubose
what he thinks of her racism. Nor does he tell her how he admires her
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courage—an opinion he does share with his children⎯to make them see
exactly what the virtue of courage is about. Instead, he sweeps his hat
off his head when he passes her house, gallantly saying things like:
“‘Good evening, Mrs. Dubose! You look like a picture this evening.’”155
Thus, despite Shaffer’s insistence that Atticus was a truth teller par
excellence, it is perfectly clear that Atticus’s conduct was in keeping
with his idea of a southern gentleman, not a passionate crusader, who
turns the world upside down by telling the truth at all times and in all
places. No society could stand such a thing. No serious moralist could
ever demand it. To me, this wise restraint under the circumstances only
enhances Atticus as a lawyer and a person worthy of emulation.
V. THOMAS MORE
Thomas More was a prominent historical figure, perhaps the
quintessential Renaissance Man. As Robert Bolt puts it:
[H]e was . . . almost indecently successful. He . . . distinguished himself first as a
scholar, then as a lawyer, was made an Ambassador, [and] finally Lord Chancellor.
A visitors’ book at his house in Chelsea would have looked like a sixteenthcentury Who’s Who . . . . He corresponded with the greatest minds in Europe as
the representative and acknowledged champion of the New Learning in England.
He was a friend of the King [Henry VIII] . . . . He adored and was adored by
his own large family.”156

He was also a fierce polemicist against “heretics,” that is, Martin Luther,
William Tyndale, indeed all who threatened his Catholic Church during
those early days of the Protestant Reformation.157 Through the years,
More has been lauded by many, both for his obviously remarkable
achievements as well as for his wit, his love of family, and his gift for
friendship.158 He has also been subject to harsh criticism for his
religious intolerance and his scathing invective against his religious

155. Id. at 115. Scout perceptively notices that Atticus never says “like a picture of
what.” Id.
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opponents.159 I have no desire—nor any need—to enter into a detailed
discussion about all aspects of the life of such a man. Instead, I will
focus on More as a lawyer and, for a variety of reasons, on the Thomas
More drawn by Robert Bolt in his award-winning play, A Man for All
Seasons.160 I do so because this fictionalized version of Thomas More is
both easily accessible to all and is more likely to be the image of the
man that most people carry with them, at least if they have seen or read
the play or the Academy Award-winning movie version, also written by
Bolt. The play was first staged in London in 1960. It won a Tony
Award on Broadway in 1962, and the film version won the Academy
Award for best picture in 1966 and the British equivalent, the BAFTA,
in 1968.161 Paul Scofield, a most distinguished British actor, won best
actor awards for his portrayal of More both on the stage and on
screen.162 He was to Thomas More what Gregory Peck was to Atticus
Finch: the living embodiment of the character and a hero to the public
and to lawyers everywhere. Recent revivals of the play have been
staged in both the West End—in 2006, starring Martin Shaw—and on
Broadway—in 2008, starring Frank Langella.163 A Man for All Seasons
gives us what we need to continue our study of lawyers in the central
tradition, worthy of emulation. It is as historically accurate as our
Lincoln story and as self-contained and vivid as our portrait of Atticus
Finch.
Bolt’s drama centers on the period of time just before More’s
appointment as Lord Chancellor until his death. Historically, that period
would have encompassed roughly a six-year span from 1529 to 1535.
The centerpiece is More’s trial, which resulted in his conviction for high
treason on July 1, 1535. He was beheaded five days later.164 In writing
his play, Bolt scrambled some historical events and sometimes altered
events for dramatic effect, but he used More’s actual words as often as
possible165 and recreated much of the trial scene from what reliable
written evidence we have.166
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The essential background facts are these. King Henry VIII had
married his older brother’s widow, Catherine, after receiving a
dispensation to do so by the Pope. For many years the marriage was
reasonably successful, but the King desperately wanted a male heir and
had none. He wished to divorce Catherine and marry the youthful and
wily Anne Boleyn with whom he was sure he could become the father of
a male child to succeed him. The Church refused to dispense with its
prior dispensation. In due course, Henry broke with the Church, divorced
Catherine, and married Anne. Unable to reconcile all these events with
his position as Lord Chancellor, Thomas More resigned, went silent on
crucial matters, and hoped to live out his retirement away from court and
from trouble.167 Alas, it was not to be.
The nub of the legal and moral problem for More was his refusal to
take the oath attached to the Act of Succession of 1534. Although More
could, and did, acknowledge that Parliament had the power to declare
who shall succeed Henry as king,168 he would not sign the oath because
it contained language that would have forced More to recognize both
that the King’s marriage to Anne Boleyn as legitimate and that Henry
was the Supreme Head of the Church in England. Each recognition
would have meant that Thomas More was no longer a good son of the
Roman Catholic Church, for neither the marriage nor Henry’s title were
considered legitimate by that body. Therefore, More would accept
neither one.169 Although he steadfastly refused to say why he would not
sign the oath, because he would not sign he was imprisoned in the Tower
of London. He was sentenced to death, however, under the Act of
Treason of 1534 because he allegedly broke his long-held silence on the
subject of Parliament’s power to declare Henry the Supreme Head of the
Church. On this subject, and the legality of the marriage, More had
adamantly maintained his silence both as a matter of law and of
conscience. However, at More’s trial, Richard Rich, later a Lord
Chancellor himself, said that More did orally deny Parliament’s
competence to declare the King Supreme Head of the Church. Rich
testified these treasonous words were spoken by More when Rich visited
More in the tower to take away his books. More denied Rich’s
assertions and offered a stinging rebuttal to the testimony. It did him no
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good, and Rich’s perjury was enough to allow the House of Lords to
take More’s life.170
Before examining More’s handling of the charges against him at his
famous trial, I want to look briefly at another part of the play that has
long enthralled lawyers. Before More’s resignation as Lord Chancellor,
there is an awkward exchange between More and Richard Rich, pictured
as an ambitious young man who was also seeking More’s patronage.
When Rich leaves, More is assailed by his wife, Alice; his favorite
daughter, Meg; and her soon-to-be husband, Will Roper, to the effect
that Rich should be arrested because he is a bad man. More responds,
“There is no law against that.”171 Shortly thereafter the following
colloquy ensues:
ALICE (Exasperated, pointing after RICH) While you talk, he’s gone!
MORE

And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the
law!

ROPER

So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!

MORE

Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil?

ROPER

I’d cut down every law in England to do that!

MORE (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on ROPER) And when the last
law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would
you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? (He leaves him) This
country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast—man’s
laws, not God’s—and if you cut them down—and you’re just the
man to do it—d’you really think you could stand upright in the
winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I’d give the Devil
benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.172

In the aftermath of the first staging of A Man for All Seasons, it was
said that “lawyers and judges from Australia to Washington, in big
rooms and little rooms” both loved and quoted that speech.173 Surely it
is a powerful statement of a lawyer’s commitment to due process of law.
As the Joint Report has it: “The lawyer’s highest loyalty . . . runs, not to
persons, but to procedures and institutions.”174 Robert Bolt’s Thomas
More tells those dearest to him that God’s laws are for God to enforce;
for him, he will trust in English law. He will hide himself and his loved
ones in the thickets of those laws. “[T]here I’m a forester,” he says. “I
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doubt if there’s a man alive who could follow me there.”175 As we shall
see, his trust in law may not have saved him in the end, but perhaps it
could have, were it not for the cowardice of those charged with
upholding it and interpreting it.
Robert Bolt was attracted to write about Thomas More for a variety of
reasons. First of all, here was a man who “seized life in great variety
and almost greedy quantities.”176 He was also attracted to More because
of “his splendid social adjustment.”177 He was not only “utterly
absorbed in his society,” but he also tried hard to cling to all that he had
achieved and all that he was a part of, continuing “to the end to make
familiar and confident use of society’s weapons, tact, favor, and, above
all, the letter of the law.”178 Nevertheless, the key quality that Bolt
marveled at was More’s “adamantine sense of his own self.”179 Bolt
continued in this way:
He knew where he began and left off, what area of himself he could yield to the
encroachments of his enemies, and what to the encroachments of those he
loved. It was a substantial area in both cases, for he had a proper sense of fear
and was a busy lover. Since he was a clever man and a great lawyer he was
able to retire from those areas in wonderfully good order, but at length he was
asked to retreat from that final area where he located his self. And there this
supple, humorous, unassuming and sophisticated person set like metal, was
overtaken by an absolutely primitive rigor, and could no more be budged than a
cliff.180

Bolt was “not a Catholic nor even in the meaningful sense of the word a
Christian.”181 So, he asks, “[W]hy do I take as my hero a man who
brings about his own death because he can’t put his hand on an old black
book and tell an ordinary lie?”182 The answer is complicated, no doubt,
and Bolt could not begin to understand it in all its complexity because he
was neither a believer, as he acknowledges, nor a lawyer, something I
would suggest Bolt would not even begin to consider as part of the
equation. But Lincoln was “Honest Abe” when he rode circuit,183 and,
as Calpurnia, the Finches’ cook, said: “‘Mr. Finch couldn’t say somethin’s
175.
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so when he doesn’t know for sure it’s so.’”184 Lawyers do not make
false statements.185 So too with Thomas More. When More begged the
King to permit him to stand aside on the subject of his majesty’s divorce,
especially because Henry had so many who saw things the King’s way,
More responded: “Then why does Your Grace need my poor support?”
And Henry said: “Because you are honest. What’s more to the purpose,
you’re known to be honest.”186
Lawyers in the central tradition do not make false statements.
Nevertheless, they sometimes remain silent—Atticus Finch, when Heck
Tate decided to lie about who killed Bob Ewell.187 And Thomas More,
firstly because he believed the law was on the side of silence. No one
could be found guilty of treason if he held his tongue on the subject.188
Moreover, in open court, More argued famously that his silence should
be construed as giving assent. When Cromwell, as prosecutor, argues
that More’s silence on the Supremacy question was “most eloquent
denial,” More has the lawyer-like comeback that a lay person might
construe as “lying,” but as an advocate in open court understands very
well: “Not so, Master Secretary, the maxim is ‘qui tacet consentire.’
(Turns to COMMON MAN) The maxim of the law is (Very carefully)
‘Silence gives consent.’ If, therefore, you wish to construe what my
silence ‘betokened,’ you must construe that I consented, not that I
denied.”189 The rest of the exchange on this point must be reproduced:
CROMWELL

Is that what the world in fact construes from it? Do you
pretend that is what you wish the world to construe from it?

MORE

The world must construe according to its wits. This Court
must construe according to the law.

CROMWELL

I put it to the Court that the prisoner is perverting the law—
making smoky what should be a clear light to discover to the
Court his own wrongdoing!

(CROMWELL’S official indignation is slipping into genuine anger and MORE
responds)
MORE

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

230

The law is not a “light” for you or any man to see by; the
law is not an instrument of any kind. (To the FOREMAN)
The law is a causeway upon which, so long as he keeps to it,
a citizen may walk safely.190
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These are not the words of a lawyer who “misleads, distorts [or]
obfuscates” the adjudicatory process191 but rather are of one lawyering
within the central tradition, trying hard to save the life of his client, even
as that life happened to be his own. So More’s silence was caused firstly
because he believed the law was on his side if he maintained his silence.
Rich’s perjury, not More’s silence, undid him. Of course, the fact that
he would not lie initially, not swear an oath to something he did not
believe, is also why he maintained his silence. Larger issues of personal
virtue and religious belief, no doubt, explain that initial silence well
enough for most. But if habit is virtue, as Aristotle said,192 and lawyers
do not make false statements of fact, then More’s being a lawyer also
had something to do with his refusal to swear an oath he did not believe.
Or so I believe.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the authors of the Joint Report said in their introduction to that
document, “It is not expected that all lawyers will agree with [every]
detail”193 in this report. It is enough that fair-minded students and
practitioners of the law can assent to the thrust of its aspirational intent
and acknowledge that Lincoln, Finch, and More are worthy of adulation.
As is evident in the stories I have told, no person is simply a lawyer,
who does or does not do one thing or another, that is, lie. The person is
also a moral agent, who does not abdicate conscience in taking on the
professional role. That is part of the central tradition as well. That is the
way we used to talk too,194 but it is a topic that must be left for another
day. At this moment it is enough that we recapture a tradition in which
we once implicitly believed. Then we can restart the discussion of
where other images have led us and get ourselves back on track.
I began this Article, focusing on, then departing from, some of the
work of my friend and colleague, Fred Zacharias.195 I end it in simple
tribute to that wide-ranging and prolific scholar and fair-minded thinker
who would have understood the spirit of this enterprise. We agreed
often, and we disagreed often enough. I think he would have said of this
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particular effort of mine, “Sure, sure, Bob, that’s all well and good,
but . . . .” Let the discussion continue in his honor.
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